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The Accord And Satisfaction And 1-207
Of The UCC
By Martin A. Frey
Blue Ribbon Stables and Sunnydale Farms, a
thoroughbred horse breeding farm, enter into a con-
tract for the sale of Handsome Charlie, a race horse.
Sunnydale fully performs by delivering Charlie.
Several weeks later, Sunnydale receives a check
from Blue Ribbon for $500,000, an amount substan-
tially less than the $1,000,000 contract price. The
check carries the notation "payment in full." Should
Sunnydale: (a) deposit the check as is; (b) strike
"payment in full," add the notation "without pre-
judice," and deposit the check; or (c) return the
check to Blue Ribbon and demand full payment?
If Blue Ribbon had sent the check to pay for a
stud fee, a service, rather than for Handsome
Charlie, himself, would the same course of action
as to the check be appropriate7
If Blue Ribbon had sent the check to compensate
Sunnydale for personal injury committed through
the negligence of a Blue Ribbon employee on the
owner of Sunnydale Farms, would the same course
of action be appropriate?
In each transaction, Sunnydale either had fully
performed or had no duty to perform and Blue Rib-
bon is attempting to discharge its duty to pay. If
both Sunnydale and Blue Ribbon had outstanding
duties, Blue Ribbon's attempt to discharge its duty
would not involve an accord and satisfaction but
rather a modification or a substitute contract. This
article is limited to the potential accord and satisfac-
tion situation, that is, where the payee has fully per-
formed or had no duty to perform.
What Is an Accord and Satisfaction?
The accord, a contract to pay a stated amount
to discharge a prior obligation, begins with a tradi-
tional offer, a promise for consideration. In the of-
fer for the accord, the drawer promises to pay the
payee the amount stated on the check as full pay-
ment in exchange for the payee's promise to take
this stated amount as full payment for the drawer's
prior obligation. While this discussion presents the
accord as a bilateral contract (a promise for a pro-
mise), an accord could be a unilateral contract (a
promise for a performance) if the consideration for
the drawer's promise were not "the payee's promise
to take the stated amount as full payment of the
drawer's obligation" but rather "the payee's taking
the stated amount as full payment of the drawer's
obligation."
By promising to take the stated amount as full
payment in exchange for the drawer's promise to
pay the stated amount as full payment, the payee
accepts the offer and forms the accord contract. The
payee's performance of his or her promise (exercis-
ing dominion over the check by an act such as
negotiating the check) is the satisfaction-
satisfaction being no more than the performance of
the accord contract. If the payee does not express-
ly promise to take the stated amount as full pay-
ment, the payee's promise may be implied from the
payee's performance (exercising dominion over the
check). Thus when the payee negotiates the check,
this exercise of dominion acts as both the acceptance
of the offer for the accord and the satisfaction of
the accord.
Editor's Note: This article updates and revises an
earlier version that appeared in the December 1984
issue of the Tulsa Lawyer.
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The accord and satisfaction promotes fairness by
protecting the bona fide expectations of the drawer
who tenders payment on condition that it will be
accepted as payment in full and provides a method
of settling disputes without litigation.
Does an Accord Exist When the Drawer's
Obligation Is Neither Unliquidated nor in
Dispute?
Since the accord is merely a contract, the tradi-
tional rules of offer and acceptance, including the
rules of consideration, apply. For an offer to exist
under classical contract law, there must be con-
sideration for the drawer's promise. The considera-
tion for "the drawer's promise to pay the stated
amount as full payment" would be "the payee's new
promise to take the lesser amount as full payment."
Thus an offer would be made. For an acceptance
to exist, there must be consideration for the payee's
promise. The consideration for "the payee's promise
to take the lesser amount as full payment" would
have to be, under the mirror image rule, "the
drawer's promise to pay the lesser amount as full
payment." If neither the existence nor the amount
of the drawer's obligation is disputed, the drawer
has a pre-existing contractual duty to pay the un-
disputed higher amount. A promise to pay only a
part of that undisputed amount cannot be new con-
sideration for the payee's promise and thus is not
an acceptance of the accord offer. Without an ac-
ceptance and thus without an accord contract, the
drawer's notation on the check, "payment in full,"
is irrelevant and the payee may exercise dominion
over the check without losing his or her right to en-
force the drawer's original promise to pay.'
Even if the drawer's obligation is neither unli-
quidated nor in dispute, new consideration for the
payee's promise can be manufactured if the payee
requires the drawer to promise to do something that
the drawer was not legally obligated to already do.
For example, if the payee required the drawer to
promise to pay a day or even an hour before the
debt is due, pay at a different place, pay a third per-
son, or pay in personal property or anything other
than money, then the drawer's promise would be
consideration for the payee's promise to -take -the
lesser amount as full payment. 2
Does an Accord Exist When the Drawer's
Obligation Is Either Unliquidated or in Dispute?
If the existence or amount of the drawer's obliga-
tion is disputed, the notation "payment in full" is
significant. When the existence or amount of the
drawer's duty under the original contract is
disputed, the drawer's promise to pay a stated
amount as full payment, by not reaffirming a pre-
existing duty, can be consideration for the payee's
promise to take the stated amount as full payment.
With this acceptance of the offer, an accord con-
tract comes into being. Performance of the accord
contract, the payee's exercise of dominion over the
check, is the satisfaction. Upon satisfaction, the
original contractual duties are discharged .
When a dispute exists, classical contract law
precludes the payee from rejecting the offer for the
accord by altering the notation on the check.' The
payee, however, may negotiate the check without
discharging the drawer if an accord cannot be
proven, or the payee does not see the obscure "pay-
ment in full" notation.6 A pleading oversight by the
drawer's attorney also may benefit the payee, since
the accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense
to a claim on the original contract and must be
alleged ii the drawer's answer to the petition.
Failure to do so constitutes a waiver.'
Does UCC 1-207 Provide the Creditor with a
Method for Accepting the Drawer's Check
without the Accord?
Concern has been expressed that section 1-207 of
the Uniform Commercial Code alters the classical
accord and satisfaction doctrine." Section 1-207, en-
titled "Performance or Acceptance Under Reserva-
tion of Rights," provides:
A party who with explicit reservation of
rights performs or promises performance or
assents to performance in a manner demanded
or offered by the other party does not thereby
prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as
"without prejudice", "under protest" or the like
are sufficient.'
It should be noted that since 1-207 is located in
article one it has broad application, that is, it ap-
plies to all subsequent articles. Had 1-207 not been
located in article one but rather in one of the subse-
quent articles (two through nine), its application
would have been limited to the scope of that
article.1o But while section 1-207 should not be
limited to article two transactions, that is, transac-
tions in goods, courts have not agreed upon its
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scope. The Wyoming Supreme Court in Jahn v.
Burns limited 1-207 to "commercial" transactions
and would not apply 1-207 to non-commercial tran-
sactions such as a check arising out of a tort claim.
A Texas Court of Appeals in Hixson v. Cox held
that 1-207 would not apply to a check sent to pay
for engineering and related services since the tran-
saction did not involve a sale of goods.12
This view requires the payee, upon receiving a
check marked "payment in full," to determine
whether the underlying transaction was a sale of
goods or not. If the transaction were a sale of goods,
it would come within the scope of article two and
1-207 would apply. The payee then could write on
the check "without prejudice" or "under protest,"
negotiate the check, and avoid an accord and
satisfaction. If the transaction were not a sale of
goods, the payee's notation on the check would be
of no avail and the payee would be bound by an
accord and satisfaction. Whether a transaction is
a sale of goods is not always simple, especially in
those hybrid transactions that are part sale of goods
and part service. This view, which creates an un-
necessary dilemma for the payee, has not been em-
braced by most courts. 4
Several state courts (Alabama, Missouri, New
York, and South Dakota) have held that section
1-207 negates the accord if the payee adds his or
her notation to the check.- Under this view the
payee could strike out the drawer's statement, write
on the check the words "without prejudice" or
"under protest," and negotiate the check without
losing his or her rights for the balance in dispute.'1
The majority of state courts having 1-207 opi-
nions (Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming), however,
refuse to apply 1-207 to the classical accord and
satisfaction." The Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Flambeau Products Corp. best summarized the
reasons why 1-207 does not apply to the accord and
satisfaction. The court found that although the
language of 1-207 could be read to apply to the ac-
cord, the words of 1-207 do not compel this con-
clusion. Moreover, if the drafters had intended to
change the accord and satisfaction doctrine in such
a significant way, the change would have been
noted in the comment, and none so appears. In fact
the comments to 1-207 suggest that 1-207 was in-
tended to apply to ongoing contracts and not to full
payment checks that terminate the contractual ar-
rangement. Also, applying 1-207 to the accord and
satisfaction would not necessarily serve to
"simplify," or "clarify," or "modernize the law
governing commercial transactions" as dictated by
1-102(2)(a) or promote these purposes and policies
of the Code as directed by section 1-102(2)(b). The
comment to 1-102(2) advises that "the text of each
section should be read in the light of the purpose
and policy of the rule or principle in question."
Since the purpose of the accord and satisfaction is
the resolution of disputes fairly and informally
without litigation, the application of 1-207, which
would permit the payee to disregard the drawer's
known intent and conditions, would seem unfair
and violative of the good faith obligation of 1-203."
Several states have discussed the 1-207 problem
and still face interesting dilenmas. The Florida
District Courts of Appeal are split in their treatment
of the accord. The Second District in Miller v. lung,
held 1-207 applicable so that a payee's notation
could negate the accord;20 the Fourth District in
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Eder v. Yvett B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., held 1-207
inapplicable;21 and the Third District in Yelen v.
Cindy's Inc., resolved the case without discussing
1-207.22 Even in New York, the various intermediate
courts do not resolve the 1-207 issue uniformly.23
The Michigan Supreme Court has yet to resolve the
1-207 issue although in Fritz v. Marantette, the
court discussed the applicability of 1-207 while fin-
ding an accord through the obsolete "meeting of the
minds" doctrine.24 The Connecticut Supreme Court
also discussed 1-207 but refused to resolve its
applicability.25
The Bottom Line-Should the Check Be
Returned or Negotiated?
Although the earlier Code cases hold that 1-207
authorizes a payee to negate the common law ac-
cord and satisfaction doctrine by striking "payment
in full" and adding the notation "without prejudice,"
the more recent cases disagree. Therefore with the
national trend preserving the common law accord
and satisfaction doctrine and with no reported
Oklahoma cases to the contrary, an Oklahoma at-
torney would be well advised to inform his or her
client to return the check to the drawer if indeed
the amount is disputed and the client does not want
to settle the drawer's obligation for the amount
stated on the check. Only if the amount is un-
disputed should a check for a lesser amount with
the notation "payment in full" be negotiated.
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